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THE ARMED FORCES COMPENSATION SCHEME: 
A SHEEP IN WOLF’S CLOTHING? 
 
Introduction 
In considering forms of compensation, Hensler argues that “[n]orms 
establishing the amount of money … paid in different circumstances … 
convey meaning about how large an obligation one set of people has to 
another … Whenever money changes hands it carries with it multiple 
messages about personal and social relationships and personal and social 
worth” (Hensler 2003, p452). When those norms emerge as a result of 
legislative rather than administrative or judicial decision-making, and the 
amounts are funded from the public purse, the opportunity arises to gauge the 
weight of the obligation to which Hensler refers and the degree to which it is 
fulfilled by a state’s compensatory initiatives.  
 
Over the course of the past decade, successive governments have been 
called upon to put a price on the UK’s obligation to those on military 
deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq through the need to rehabilitate and 
compensate members of the armed forces who have suffered damage as a 
result of being placed in harm’s way. Advances in warfare and in-theatre 
medical backup mean that active service personnel survive injuries that would 
previously have proved fatal (Gawande 2004, p2472). This, in combination 
with the enemy combatants’ unconventional tactics, use of weaponry 
designed to inflict maximum damage (Buckham and Tucker 2007, p1558), the 
duration of troops’ engagement and a public and media determined to see 
that those injured get what they ‘deserve’, has increased pressure on both 
state coffers and those holding the purse strings. In light of Hensler’s 
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observation, here we examine the unique and evolving manifestation of a form 
of state compensation that is the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme 
(AFCS) in an attempt to assess whether it values adequately the citizens it 
was created for. 
The Armed Forces Compensation Scheme   
The AFCS came into being on 6 April 2005 through an exercise of powers 
conferred by s1(2) of the Armed Forces (Pensions and Compensation) Act 
2004. It replaced the system of disablement pensions contained in the War 
Pensions Scheme and Armed Forces Pension Scheme 1975, and provides 
no-fault compensation to regular and reservist military personnel for illness, 
injury or death attributable to service on or after 6 April 2005. Delivered by the 
Service Personnel and Veterans Agency (SPVA), the AFCS is tariff-based. In 
its current form it specifies a lump sum for each injury suffered and awards a 
life-long, tax-free, index-linked Guaranteed Income Payment (GIP) to the 
more severely debilitated as a means of offsetting loss of earning capacity. 
Compensation calculations are based on a set of nine tables, each of which 
refers to a different category of injury, covering physical, psychological and 
sensory damage in its seemingly infinite variety. Within each table awards 
range across a 15-point scale, from a high of £570,000 (Tariff Level 1) for the 
most severe damage of its type, to a low of £1,155 (Tariff Level 15) for the 
least severe.  
 
The GIP is also calibrated by severity of injury, with payment being awarded 
only to those victims who qualify from points 1 to 11 on the 15-point scale 
applicable to their injuries, an approach intended to reflect realistically an 
individual’s shortfall in earnings as a result of damage sustained on active 
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service. Those eligible at Tariff Levels 1 to 4 receive the full, ‘Band A’, GIP 
payment, along with the full lump sum at the relevant tariff for each 
compensatable injury. Those suffering injuries at Levels 5 and 6 (Band B) 
have their GIP reduced by 50%, at Levels 7 and 8 (Band C) by 50% and at 
Levels 9 to 11 by 70%. Where a reduced GIP is awarded, any lump sum is 
correspondingly decreased such that the recipient does not receive the full 
amount for each of his injuries. The most serious condition is awarded at 
100% of the tariff level, the second most serious at 30% and the third most 
serious at 15%, with further damage or conditions contributing nothing to the 
award.  
 
To date 16,405 injury claims have been registered under the AFCS of which 
13,270 have been cleared. Compensation has been awarded in 6,760 cases 
whilst 5,455 claims were rejected and 1,060 withdrawn. Of the 6,760 awards 
made, 93% (6,280) consisted of a lump sum only, with the remaining 7% 
(480) comprising a lump sum and GIP payment. Of the 480 service personnel 
in receipt of both a lump sum and GIP, 85 (1.3%) have been awarded at the 
fullest amount, namely 100% of both the GIP and tariff level for each injury. 
Between 2005 and 2009 disbursements under the Scheme rose from £1.3m 
to £33.5m and the value of future disbursements from £7.2m to £352.4m 
(DASA 2010). 
 
To all intents and purposes, the AFCS demonstrates what Culhane identifies 
as the “hallmarks” of compensation schemes, namely “the elimination of fault, 
relative speed of claim resolution, and limited damages" resulting in “smaller 
and more predictable” payouts (Culhane 2003, p1085). That a compensation 
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scheme, as opposed to the litigation process, bears observable hallmarks and 
may demand some degree of quantitative trade off to be made for the sake of 
certainty and predictably, has not prevented the AFCS from being roundly 
criticised as “at best inadequately thought through and at worst fundamentally 
flawed” (HC666, Summary) because of its apparent undervaluing of the 
sacrifices made by armed forces personnel. 
The AFCS Under Fire 
Although Hensler makes reference chiefly to amounts of money involved in 
obligation fulfilment, it is clear that, insofar as the AFCS is concerned, quantity 
is not the sole measurement of significance. In addition to criticism of the 
amount of compensation paid out to individuals, two other types of concern 
arise routinely. The first is qualitative, attaching to how claims are assessed, 
processed and awards calculated. Measured by the qualitative yardstick, the 
major problems exhibited by the AFCS are that “the formulaic way in which 
compensation is pegged ignores the fact that a broken body is so much more 
than the sum of constituent injuries” (Andrew Murrison 2007, col789), that the 
Scheme makes “illogical” (HC96-1, para80) distinctions between types of 
injury, that it “addresses quality of life forgone in the most bludgeonly way 
imaginable” (Andrew Murrison 2007, col789) and that, in administering the 
Scheme, the SPVA moves “at the speed of a striking sloth" (Colonel Bob 
Stewart, Daily Telegraph 29.06.09). Thus, where the AFCS had been billed as 
an initiative which it was hoped would provide “generous help for the most 
seriously injured” military personnel through its commitment to “quick, 
consistent and equitable” (Veterans Agency 2005) decision-making, it is 
decried as “a victory for bureaucracy over bravery” (Daily Telegraph 
03.08.09). 
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The second kind of concern expressed is at the AFCS’s mimicry of the civil 
claims system, an apparent result of the MoD’s desire to “reduce the number 
of civil negligence cases brought … by Service personnel” (HC666, para 150) 
and, “like an insurance company loss adjuster intent on minimising its liability” 
(Buckham and Tucker, p1558) save money. In identifying the sheep-in-wolf’s-
clothing characteristics of the AFCS, attention initially focussed on the use of 
the Judicial Studies Board Guidelines for the Assessment of General 
Damages in Personal Injury Cases as the basis for the AFCS 15-tier tariff. In 
the Scheme’s consultation stages, the Defence Select Committee was highly 
critical of the MoD’s attempt “to emulate the civil claims system for calculating 
awards”, arguing that it amounted to “forcing the compensation arrangements 
into a format which clearly does not work” (HC666, para 150), which was 
“unhelpfully mechanistic” (HC96-1, para 74), which ignored “the fact that 
similar injuries will affect the employment prospects of different personnel in 
different ways” and could “cause radically different levels of pain and suffering 
to different people”, which would “continue to be the case, no matter how tariff 
boundaries are drawn and redrawn” (HC96-1, paras 80-82).  
 
A further element of the Scheme deemed unworkable, and burdensome for 
hard-pressed and debilitated claimants, was the adaptation of the burden of 
proof from the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard employed under previous 
arrangements to the civil ‘balance of probabilities’ standard under the AFCS. 
The MoD maintained that this was the right course of action because it 
reflected the general approach in occupational schemes and in modern civil 
court practice: the seeking of “evidence-based decisions using a balance of 
probabilities standard of proof” (MoD 2003, p6). It was argued, however, that 
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this would be detrimental to claimants whose ability to secure a favourable 
outcome was dependent upon the record-keeping of the employer against 
whom the claim was being brought: “Armed Forces personnel are … in an 
unusual position by the fact that their medical records are in the hands of the 
employer against whom any claim for compensation will be made” (Kennedy 
2010, p8). This difficulty did not only affect claimants but also army medical 
staff, it being deemed “wrong in principle” that they should be “creating the 
documents on which compensation claims will be based while at the same 
time relying for employment on the very employer against whom those 
compensation claims will be made” (Kennedy 2010, p8). In addition, it was felt 
that “because of the special risks that Armed Forces personnel are required to 
run, and because they are likely to be involved in situations of great 
uncertainty, with uncertain effects on their health … the onus should remain 
on the Government to prove that service was not responsible for causing or 
worsening a condition for which a compensation claim is made” (HC96-1, para 
69).  
 
Further issue was taken with the time limits imposed by the AFCS. Within the 
regulatory framework, any initial claim must be made within five years either of 
the occurrence of the injury or medical treatment being sought for the injury 
where, previously, under the War and Armed Forces Pension schemes, no 
time limit existed. Initially, the MoD had proposed a three year deadline but it 
was argued that this was not sufficiently open-ended to embrace complex or 
late-onset conditions, particularly in light of the fact that 70% of claims already 
fell outside that time limit (HC666, para 92). Five years therefore represented 
a compromise but not a happy one as it appeared that many claimants would 
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struggle to meet its demands. To illustrate the point, that the introduction of 
the balance of probabilities test and the five year time limit would be 
detrimental to claimants, the Royal British Legion applied the criteria to the 
5,000 claims it processed during 2002/3. The experiment demonstrated that 
up to 60% of those claims would have failed (Kennedy 2010, p7) tending, 
perhaps, to support Culhane’s view that where a given compensatory 
framework exhibits a quasi-civil flavour, it is unmasked as a mere 
“bureaucratic mechanism” designed to “displace” (Culhane 2003, p1055) Tort 
law or provide a “bent” (Culhane 2003, p1027) version of it that promises an 
equivalence that it fails to deliver in substance.    
 
The final, overriding, concern is quantitative, relating to the amount of 
compensation paid by the AFCS when compared with damages paid out in 
Tort. The AFCS is said to demonstrate that the law “places a higher value on 
civilian casualties than on military ones” (Julian Brazier 2007, col 749) 
because, routinely, the amount of compensation awarded under the scheme 
is less than that awarded in civil proceedings meaning that “many service 
personnel are still getting much less than civilians for the same kind of 
disability.” (Lord Ashley of Stoke 2008, col 652). Meredith has noted that 
AFCS awards are between 30 and 40 per cent less than they would be at 
common law (Meredith 2006, p172). As a result, it is claimed that it is difficult 
to see the AFCS “as anything other than a second-rate deal … which uniquely 
attempts to swim against the tide of society's prevailing compensation culture” 
(Andrew Murrison 2007, col 789). The issue has been taken up by an enraged 
and highly motivated media which, by way of campaigning to close the gap 
between the AFCS and the civil litigation system, relentlessly records the 
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disparities in awards, along with criticisms of the AFCS made by families of 
those injured, military organisations and the public at large. 
The Media’s War of Attrition 
Bartrip claims that, in order for a no-fault compensation scheme to become 
established, four conditions need to be met. Firstly, there must be a coherent 
class of victims who, secondly, find themselves in a distinctive position with, 
thirdly, a degree of public support and, finally, an electorally or politically 
attractive ‘package’ on offer. The first two conditions are easily met. “It is” 
Bartrip indicates “widely accepted that members of the armed forces 
constitute a coherent group that deserves special treatment in terms of 
compensation by virtue of the fact that they have volunteered or been 
conscripted with the prospect of facing extreme danger in the service of their 
country” (Bartrip 2010, p284). The unique position of the armed forces is also 
recognised by their political masters who note that “[t]he essential difference 
between the armed services and almost all other employment is that … 
personnel can be asked to put themselves in harm's way, indeed to die for 
their country” which “makes compensation for injury a rather different issue for 
the Armed Forces than for civilians” (HC96-1, para68). The third requirement 
is also met in that modifications to the AFCS have not faltered for the want of 
a “powerful interest group or surge of public opinion demonstrat[ing] a 
commitment to changing the law” (Bartrip 2010, p285). The media has proved 
most influential in this regard and seeking a more robust form of obligation 
fulfilment from the state has produced frequent headlines.  
 
Needless to say, the fact of Bartrip’s third requirement being met in the 
manner described below implies that satisfaction of the fourth condition – the 
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need for a politically attractive package – relied upon the realisation and 
success of the third. It may, however, be argued that the closer the 2010 
General Election loomed, the more politically attractive a series of 
amendments to the AFCS became, an argument supported by the assertion 
that “the decision to pay is made by the government in order to maximize 
political benefits to decision-makers. To put it simply, there are cases when 
payment of compensation brings high political benefits at relatively low 
political costs. In such cases, the government will voluntarily pay 
compensation” (Bell and Parchomovsky 2006, p1441). 
 
In campaigning for an AFCS more generously tilted towards claimants, 
amongst others the media turned its gaze on former Lance Bombardier Kerry 
Fletcher who, in 2008, was awarded £186,895.52 by an Employment Tribunal 
in her claim against the MoD for sex discrimination, victimisation and sexual 
harassment and who commented that she was “disgusted” at and 
“embarrassed by” (The Guardian 27.08.09) the meagre compensation offered 
to those injured in service, particularly in light of the extent to which the MoD 
appeared to be channelling significant resources towards compensating not 
only herself but other, less deserving, kinds of claimant. For example, the 
MoD paid out £117,000 to the owners of a racehorse which injured itself after 
being scared by aircraft, £42,000 to a poultry farmer whose hens suffered 
diminished egg production due to the fright induced by the Red Arrows display 
team flying overhead and £52,000 to a claimant who suffered Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder due to jets undertaking low-flying exercises over Devon (Daily 
Telegraph, 13.01.10).  
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These were not isolated instances. Ms Fletcher’s expression of her views had 
been preceded by media and public outrage at an RAF data entry clerk’s 
award of £484,000 in compensation for a Repetitive Strain Injury (The 
Guardian, 30.11.08) when compared with the £57,587 lump sum and annual 
payment of £9,000 for life awarded to Private Jamie Cooper who suffered a 
broken pelvis, stomach wounds, nerve damage to a leg and a shattered right 
hand in a mortar blast (Daily Telegraph, 12.02.08) or the £161,000 offered to 
double amputee marine, Ben McBean (The Guardian, 30.11.08), or the 
£152,150 initially offered to Paratrooper Ben Parkinson who spent months in a 
coma after losing both legs to a landmine and sustaining grievous damage to 
his spine, skull, brain, pelvis, hands, spleen and ribcage (Daily Mail, 
28.08.07). After a sustained campaign by his family, a supportive media, 
armed forces associations and the general public, Ben Parkinson’s award was 
increased to £285,000 and then £540,000, albeit as a result of the appeals 
process and amendments to the AFCS rather than the moral strength of his 
individual case.     
 
Both Ministers and the judiciary deemed the simple comparison between 
civilian awards and awards under the AFCS “inappropriate” (Lord Tunnicliffe 
2008, col 652) and “illegitimate” on the basis that compensation rather than 
fault-finding constituted the goal of the AFCS: “negligence is not taken into 
account” (AD and MM (a), para 42) because the Scheme is not based on the 
claimant having to prove negligence or breach of the health and safety 
regulations by the MoD. The distinction between fault and no-fault liability was 
lost on the AFCS’s detractors as it became increasingly clear that, in its 
original, 2005 incarnation, the AFCS provided inadequate satisfaction, either 
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to claimants or to wider society. As a result, two major changes were made to 
the Scheme. From February 2008 anyone suffering more than one injury in a 
single incident, who was also awarded a GIP, would receive, on the relevant 
tariff, the full award for each injury, with a backdated award being made to 
those paid out before the introduction of the new rules (The Armed Forces 
and Reserve Forces (Compensation Scheme) (Amendment) Order 2008 SI 
2008/39). In terms of amounts payable, the aggregated lump sum remained 
subject to a cap of £285,000 but the July 2008 publication of the Service 
Personnel Command Paper saw lump sum payments being lifted by between 
10 and 100 per cent depending on the severity of the injury. The maximum 
award was now set at £540,000 which change became effective on 15 
December 2008. The Armed Forces and Reserve Forces (Compensation 
Scheme) (Amendment No. 3) Order 2008; SI 2008/2942) again applied to 
those claims already processed. If, however, the review of and amendments 
to the AFCS seemed to demonstrate a government committed to its 
obligations under the military covenant, the MoD’s subsequent actions caused 
a sharp intake of breath.   
Advance: Duncan and McWilliams 
Corporal Anthony Duncan of the Light Dragoons and Royal Marine Matthew 
McWilliams were both injured in 2005. Whilst on foot patrol in Iraq, the former 
was shot in the thigh by a high velocity bullet, which fractured his left femur. 
The latter fractured his right femur during a training exercise. Under the AFCS 
they were awarded £9,250 and £8,250 respectively for their injuries. As a 
result of complications ensuing from their injuries, the War Pensions and 
Armed Forces Compensation Tribunal increased these awards to £46,000 
and £28,750, with each man also entitled to a GIP on leaving the armed 
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forces. With “breathtaking clumsiness” motivated by “unseemly penny 
pinching” (The Economist, 08.01.09) the increased award was immediately 
subjected to legal challenge by the MoD, which argued that payments should 
be limited to the soldier's initial injuries and not take account of subsequent 
disabilities, especially those which emerged as a result of medical treatment.  
The initial ruling, by the Administrative Appeals Chamber of the Upper 
Tribunal, found “no substance in the submission made for the Secretary of 
State … that the results of medical treatment are not to be taken into account 
in the assessment of the injury for the purposes of benefit unless medical 
treatment is expressly referred to in the [AFCS’s] chosen descriptor” and 
deemed it “entirely artificial and absurd… to exclude the effects of medical 
treatment that would not have been carried out if the service incident or 
circumstance had not occurred” (Secretary of State for Defence v AD and MM 
[2009] UKUT 10 (AAC) para 26). For the Tribunal, the issue was “one of 
causation” such that where a claimant received “appropriate medical 
treatment for any initiating injury predominantly caused by service, the injury 
… does not cease to have been predominantly caused by service … But for 
the initiating injury caused by service, there would be no requirement for the 
treatment” (Secretary of State for Defence v AD and MM [2009] UKUT 10 
(AAC) para 32). The enhanced awards would, therefore, stand, being 
“consistent with the apparent and undisputed purpose of the AFCS, which is 
to provide compensation to members and former members of the armed 
forces whose physical and mental health has been adversely affected by their 
service at levels related to the extent of those adverse effects” (Secretary of 
State for Defence v AD and MM [2009] UKUT 10 (AAC) para 26). The MoD 
was given leave to appeal.  
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The Court of Appeal (CA), delivering its judgment in the context of what it 
somewhat understatedly called the “adverse publicity” (Secretary of State for 
Defence v Duncan and McWilliams [2009] EWCA Civ 1043 para 116) 
accompanying the case, adjudged that “the mere application of proper and 
appropriate medical treatment … cannot of itself constitute an independent 
injury [n]or … render more severe the initiating injury” (Secretary of State for 
Defence v Duncan and McWilliams [2009] EWCA Civ 1043 para 67). That 
being the case, the Upper Tribunal was “wrong to say that … a perfectly 
proper and appropriate treatment … was of itself capable of converting the 
initial injury … into a more serious one, solely on the grounds that it extended 
the range of the initial injury. The cure did not compound the injury” (Secretary 
of State for Defence v Duncan and McWilliams [2009] EWCA Civ 1043 para 
68). This did not, however, mean that the Court accepted the MoD’s 
submission that it was solely the original injury which should form the basis for 
compensation. In the CA’s view, “the fact that an injury results from medical 
treatment does not of itself necessarily break the chain of causation so as to 
prevent compensation being payable with respect to it. The need for medical 
treatment is inextricably linked with the original injury, and at least where the 
treatment is appropriate, any injury resulting from the treatment must be 
treated as having been causally connected to the original injury” (Secretary of 
State for Defence v Duncan and McWilliams [2009] EWCA Civ 1043 para 
para 63). It was patently clear that “not all medical treatment is risk free. 
Frequently, there are risks that quite independent illness or injury may result 
from carrying out perfectly proper medical treatment. If the risk materialises … 
the consequential injury is referable to the original injury in service and there 
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is no break in the chain of causation” (Secretary of State for Defence v 
Duncan and McWilliams [2009] EWCA Civ 1043 para 69). As such “where the 
appropriate medical treatment carries a risk of further distinct injuries, or the 
exacerbation of existing injuries, and the risk materialises, these can properly 
be treated as grounds for increasing the compensation which would have 
been awarded for the initiating injury itself” since there could be “no 
justification for failing to compensate separately for such injuries” (Secretary of 
State for Defence v Duncan and McWilliams [2009] EWCA Civ 1043 para 69).  
 
The CA remanded the two cases to the First Tier Tribunal which would 
undertake a thorough, fact-sensitive assessment in light of the senior court’s 
somewhat circular advice since, whilst the MoD was “entirely justified … at 
least from a legal point of view” in bringing the case, it was not for the CA to 
“to distort the framework of the scheme in order to fill apparent gaps, or to 
reconcile apparent inconsistencies” (Secretary of State for Defence v Duncan 
and McWilliams [2009] EWCA Civ 1043 para 126). In making its judgment in 
the Duncan and McWilliams case, the CA stated that it was to be hoped that 
the AFCS could “gradually be improved in a way which better meets the 
laudable objectives” (Secretary of State for Defence v Duncan and 
McWilliams [2009] EWCA Civ 1043 para 126) of “fairness, simplicity and 
affordability” (Secretary of State for Defence v Duncan and McWilliams [2009] 
EWCA Civ 1043 para 119).  
Retreat: The Boyce Review 
On 16 July 2009, seemingly in an attempt to deflect the heat generated by the 
Duncan and McWilliams appeals, the MoD brought forward by a year its 
planned review of the AFCS. The Green Paper (Cm7674) which ushered in a 
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three-month consultation period in relation to the support afforded to service 
personnel stated that the aim of the review was to build on the nation’s 
‘renewed commitment’ to its armed forces expressed in the Service Personnel 
Command Paper of 12 months before (Cm7424). Two principles drove that 
renewed commitment. Firstly, the government aimed to “end any 
disadvantage that armed service imposes” and, secondly, wished to “better 
support and recognise those who have been wounded in the service of their 
country” (Cm7424, para 6). It was questionable whether, thus far, either 
commitment had been sufficiently met. 
 
On 17 September 2009 former Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral The Lord 
Boyce, was announced as the Chair of the Review and of the independent 
scrutiny group of stakeholders (service organisations, service families' 
representatives, AFCS claimants, medical experts, legal experts) set up to 
support its inquiries. The Boyce Review reported on 10 February 2010 and, 
whilst it found the AFCS to be “fundamentally sound” and based on “broadly 
sound” (Boyce, p13) principles, proposed a series of amendments aimed at 
enhancing its fitness for purpose. The proposed amendments met a number 
of the criticisms identified above (though the balance of probabilities test 
would remain), were accepted in full by the Labour government and 
subsequently endorsed by the coalition administration which adopted a two-
stage legislative programme to introduce the necessary changes. The first 
stage made effective from 3 August 2010 the extension of time limits for injury 
claims from 5 to 7 years and, for claiming for late onset conditions, from one 
to 3 years from the date that medical help was first sought. This first tranche 
of amendments also included increases in payments for hearing loss and an 
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inflationary increase to the bereavement grant, from £20,000 to £25,000. This 
tinkering will give way to altogether more fundamental changes in February 
2011. Then, all lump sum amounts from Levels 2 to 15 will increase. The 
increase is not uniform across all Levels but is intended better to reflect the 
impact of the injuries specified at each. For example, injuries at Level 15 will 
receive a relatively small uplift of £45, whereas injuries at Level 3 are awarded 
an additional £150,000. The top award of £470,000 at Level 15 remains 
unchanged, it being deemed an appropriately calibrated payment. Alongside 
these modifications, compensation will be payable for each injury sustained in 
a single incident rather than the three worst injuries, and the maximum award 
for mental illness will be increased from Tariff Level 8 to Tariff Level 6.  
 
In addition to amendments to lump sums payable, in February 2011 the GIP 
will undergo a couple of important changes. Firstly, it will be increased to take 
account of promotion prospects affected by the claimant’s injuries. This will be 
done by factoring in the average number of promotions that would have been 
achieved by a claimant of that age but for his or her injuries. Secondly, the 
impact of injuries will be assessed on earnings calculated to age 65, rather 
than the current 55. Thirdly, the time limit for requesting reconsideration of a 
compensation decision will be increased from 3 months to one year. All of the 
changes will be backdated to the start of the AFCS and, as such, some 
10,000 claims will be reviewed by the SPVA, which must complete its task by 
June 2012 (Defence Internal Brief 2010, p1).   
 
Largely, the amendments were well received, with the Review being hailed as 
a “welcome victory” and triumph resulting from the “tidal wave support that the 
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Government simply couldn’t ignore” (Royal British Legion 2010, Press 
Release). Currently, however, issues remain. Two of them are practical, and 
one is theoretical. On the level of practicalities, the first issue is that the new 
and more generous arrangements apply only to those compensated under the 
AFCS. That is, those injured in service since 6 April 2005. This means that 
service personnel may wind up being treated unequally and arbitrarily despite, 
in essence, fighting in the same conflict in the same location: the mobilisation 
of forces in the War on Terror has, after all, claimed victims on either side of 
that dateline without discrimination. The second practical concern is how the 
improvements to the Scheme will be paid for since it has been made 
abundantly clear that “costs will be met from existing provision” (Defence 
Internal Brief 2010, p9) and that nothing else may be cut to pay for the 
improvements. In the prevailing economic climate, resolving that issue will 
doubtless prove an unenviable task.   
 
From a theoretical perspective, it appears that, in the pursuit of a Tort-like 
system of compensation, the important distinction between distributive and 
corrective justice collapsed. The traditional adoption of distinctive approaches 
in the private and public spheres of compensatory practice may partially be 
attributed to the maintenance of the difference between corrective and 
distributive justice since, as Culhane notes, “the two concepts serve different 
goals” (Culhane 2003, p1033). In the private sphere, Tort law, as corrective 
justice, is “concerned with repairing an inequality between parties that 
wrongful conduct has created” (Culhane 2003, p1027) whereas, in the public 
sphere, distributive justice “considers broader questions about the proper and 
just allocation of goods within a society” (Culhane 2003, p1027). In short, 
18 
 
therefore, a respectable level of compensation under the AFCS should have 
be possible from the outset without the need for the assimilatory frolic that 
saw the MoD attempting to import both procedure and payouts in Tort, and 
falling short.  The ‘right’ outcome – a decent level of compensation - could 
have been achieved simply by raising the level of AFCS awards in order to 
channel additional monies to injured service personnel.  Government need not 
have “chipped away at the wall between the two kinds of justice” (Culhane 
2003, p1064).  
 
Usually, the trade in justice runs from the distributive to the corrective since 
“the idea of tort law as a non-instrumental mechanism is out of fashion" 
(Culhane 2003, p1077). In this instance, however, the reverse appears to be 
true with the AFCS being invested with the form and process, if not the full 
substance, of corrective justice.  This brings us “to an uneasy place 
somewhere between corrective and distributive justice” (Culhane 2003, 
p1079) where it may be argued that, to the extent that the AFCS mimics Tort, 
it undercuts one of the important functions of distributive justice which is to 
ascribe fair and proper value to the actions of citizens. As El Menyawi 
observes, “when compensation becomes the central goal, we are … shifting 
away from a fault based system towards a no-fault system based on collective 
support” and, as such, “[t]hese alternative compensation schemes … exist 
independently from liability law” (El Menyawi 2002, p45). As things currently 
stand, military personnel may well be argued to be receiving more appropriate 
levels of compensation but they are receiving it for the wrong reasons.   
Conclusion 
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Whatever the strength of the criticisms of the AFCS, what should not be 
overlooked is that it is funded from the public purse. Culhane argues that 
where “the source is general revenue … [I]n as much as it is taxpayers … who 
are paying … government cannot consider the needs of the victims … in 
isolation. Instead, it has a responsibility for ensuring that the needs of all 
citizens are considered” (Culhane 2003, p1027) In the setting up of a state-
funded compensation scheme, therefore, the making of “a distributional 
decision to expend taxpayer money” (Culhane 2003, p1033) is never neutral 
but is always, and necessarily, infected with additional considerations and  
coloured by competing demands.  In the case of the AFCS, the factoring in of 
such considerations should not have meant that injured members of the 
armed forces were denied adequate compensation on the basis that to pay 
what their sacrifices were truly worth would create an unacceptable drain on 
public resources. Quite the opposite. The difficulty for many citizens is that 
“[p]atriotism and appreciation for soldiers doing the dirty work wrestle … with 
anger over official mishandling of conflicts seen by many as an illegal and 
costly mistake … or an unwinnable misadventure” (The Economist, 08.01.09). 
As Dandeker et al note, “a significant feature of civil-military relations is the 
way in which states recognize the sacrifices that the men and women of the 
armed forces have given to their country” (Dandeker 2006, p161).  The state 
should not, therefore, have read any element of choice into whether it spent 
public money on providing service personnel with sufficient compensation 
since the need of citizens, in “formidable coalition” (The Economist, 08.01.09), 
is that, in the context of the “combustible topic” (The Economist, 08.01.09) of 
the UK’s deployment of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, the efforts and 
sacrifices of service personnel are properly rewarded.   
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